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Introduction 
The present report is the third of a series of planned Policy Papers, which will present the 
views of Polish non-governmental communities concerning those international issues that are 
important from the point of view of European integration. 
This project was initiated by the Stefan Batory Foundation. We invite various non-
government organisations to co-operate on successive reports. 
This text, which we have the pleasure to present to you, was prepared in co-operation with the 
Center for International Relations, where – with the support of the German Marshall Fund of 
the United States – the project “Transatlantic Partnership and Poland’s Interests” is being 
realised.  
In the work on this Policy Paper also independent experts have participated. We thank 
all those persons who have contributed to the drafting of this paper for their kind 
assistance and valuable comments. 
By using the formula of short policy papers, we wish to discuss in a comprehensible manner 
for the Western reader on matters that are important for the future of Europe, and also to 
contribute to the animation of the debate on this subject in Poland. We do not wish to limit 
ourselves to the presentation of the point of view of Poland and Poland’s interests alone. It is 
our ambition that our proposals should take into account the general European perspective 
and provide a true contribution to the debate on the desirable shape of the external policy of 
the European Union. 
We believe that an important role may be played in this discussion by the non-governmental 
organisations. They are not constrained by the numerous limitations resulting from the 
requirements of current politics and negotiations with the Union. It also seems that the 
opinions of Polish non-government communities might be found interesting, as we surely 
have a different way of looking at many issues than the present members of the European 
Union. 
We have the pleasure to invite you to read and discuss these papers. 
 
Stefan Batory Foundation 
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In recent months we observe a heated debate on the future of the Trans-Atlantic 
relations. Although the problem of the new arrangement of the relations between Europe and 
the United States of America emerged in the early nineteen-nineties, its present dynamics 
indicate that the impact of the phenomena resulting from the ending of the cold war does not 
disappear, and some of them have only now revealed their political significance. The present 
decade will therefore surely pass under the mark of discussions on the shape of the Euro-
Atlantic relations. One of the key points of that debate consists of the question on the scope of 
political and military self-dependence within the Trans-Atlantic community, including above 
all Europe’s capacity to react to crisis situations. 
 In this context it seems extremely important and timely to raise the question of 
the significance of the enlargement of the European Union to the East in terms of its relations 
with the United States. In the countries of the European Union the prevailing opinion is that 
the candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) aspiring to join the EU, and 
especially Poland, are very strongly pro-American. To what extent is this stereotype true? The 
answer to this question is important from the perspective of the present Fifteen member 
countries due to the continuing discussions among them on the role of the Union in the 
assurance of security for their continent. The assumption of that role is reflected, among other 
things, by the development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). 
The answer to the question concerning the significance of enlargement is also important for 
the candidate countries – in order for them to be able to define their own role in the future, in 
the enlarge European Union. Finally, this issue ought to be considered with interest in the 
countries situated to the East of the continent, such as Russia or the Ukraine and Belarus, 
which will soon become neighbours of the EU. 
 
 The present Policy Paper is devoted to the issues concerning the problems of 
security in Euro-Atlantic relations. It does not cover the entire field of Trans-Atlantic 
relations. The time horizon of the issues raised in this Paper extends until the year 2010. 
Therefore, the term CESDP is used by the authors not only as a denotation of the decisions of 
the European Council from Helsinki, but also of the idea to transform the EU into an 
organisation assuming co-responsibility for the security of Europe. 
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I. Appraisal of the Current Situation 
 
1. The European Union – USA: Through Political Integration Toward Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership 
 
European integration inevitably leads the countries of the European Union toward the 
development of the political union. The force that provides that process with dynamics 
consists of the tightening of the economic co-operation within Europe to such an extent as to 
enforce political integration. It is also the outcome of an intentionally realised political 
project. The two above-indicated tendencies were reflected in the decision to form the 
economic and monetary union, which is not only the final stage of economic integration but 
also, more importantly, it presses for the replacement of close co-ordination of the policies of 
the EU countries by their common actions. 
The elimination of national currencies, internal borders and the development of a common 
migration policy is accompanied also by the process of integration in the areas of foreign 
policy, security and defence. This is not caused, as is often believed, only by the ambitions of 
some of the countries of the Union. The necessity to present the political interests of Europe 
to the World with one voice has its source in the conviction of the existence of many 
problems and threats, which are common to the Union as a whole, regardless of the 
geographic location, the positions and ambitions of its particular members. As Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt argue: “The European states can count on maintaining their 
influence in the world under one condition – that they will jointly develop such a structure of 
the Union, which will make it work effectively as a whole. Otherwise, will our voice be heard 
on such matters as: the application of international law, the limitation of armaments, reaction 
to wars in other parts of the world (...)?” 
Under the influence of the Balkan lesson most politicians do not question any longer that 
the continuing tension in the Middle East, the potential for destabilisation in the 
Mediterranean region, are causes for concern also for the EU members in the North of 
Europe. Similarly: the development of the situation on the area of the former USSR carries 
the risk of disrupting the internal stability of the southern countries. The awareness of these 
mutually dependent relations is the factor, which most strongly enhances the development of 
common positions, and also, although still with rather mild force, the undertaking of common 
actions in international politics. So in spite of the fact that the voice of Europe is still not as 
loud as could be expected from the numerous declarations, the main problem is not any more 
the lack of consent for the very idea of joint communications with the outside world, but the 
weakness of the mechanisms involved and the of the institutions in charge of such 
communications. 
The Achilles heel of European policy consists also of the deficiency of adequate means 
and instruments, above all of military capacity, with the help of which the EU could add 
credibility to its propositions. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also the months preceding 
the outbreak of the war in Kosovo, have overwhelmingly revealed the sterility of European 
threats addressed to the parties of the conflict, giving reason to question the sense of the 
existence of the common foreign and defence policy. Although the military weakness of the 
Fifteen gives reason for many people to have no faith in the effectiveness of the EU in coping 
with emerging threats, the dynamics of the works continued since the summit of the European 
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Union in Cologne (June 1999) on the creation of the common security and defence policy, 
allows for optimism. Its source may consist above all of the power of European integration, 
resulting from historical experience, which, contrary to the projects based only on co-
operation, has been able to exert an exceptionally strong pressure upon the countries involved 
in the integration process. Just as the economic and monetary union has led to the sanation of 
the public finances of the countries of the Union, the concept of a common defence policy, 
especially when institutionally refined and supported by adequate financial commitments of 
the EU members, may initiatie the process of strengthening the European armies, the rational 
system of arms procurement and the recovery of the defence industry. According to the head 
of Polish diplomacy Władysław Bartoszewski: – “It may also be of significance for the 
internal policy, as it will make the EU more credible for its citizens. The same psychological 
mechanism is at work here as in the case of the power attributes of the nation state: a strong 
state must possess effective armed forces.” 
The political integration of Europe will also lead to the balancing of the relations with the 
United States in the area of security policy. Although that process is perceived on both sides 
of the Atlantic as necessary in order to preserve the strong ties binding Europe with America, 
it leads to many disputes, above all concerning the nature and the principles of the co-
operation between NATO and the EU. Their cause lies in the changed geo-political situation 
in the world, whereby the Euro-Atlantic security is now to a small degree a matter of the 
capacity for defence against a massive military attack. Increasing importance, however, is 
coming to rest with the capacity to counteract against new types of threats, originating from 
internal destabilisation of given states, terrorism, or the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. The problem of security, therefore, is the subject to various interpretations and is 
the object of political games among the allies. 
The still continuing disputes concerning the development by the United States of the 
Strategic Missile Defence system demonstrate that Europe differs from its partner not only in 
terms of the way of perceiving the threats, but also of counteraction against them. Most EU 
countries estimate the possibility of attack from South Korea, for example, a rather unlikely. 
Whereas the United States conduct a policy largely based on the isolation of the “states of 
concern” presenting a threat for the security of the world, Europe traditionally attempts to 
soften the undemocratic regimes by dialogue and attempts at co-operation. The countries 
belonging to the EU are opposed to the undermining of the entire system of armaments 
agreements developed on the basis of the ABM treaty of 1972. 
The idea of the creation by the EU of a common security and defence policy, in turn, for a 
long time did not meet with understanding among the American politicians. This resulted 
from the conviction deeply entrenched in their minds that the European allies should above all 
focus on the improvement of their military capacities in the framework of NATO. The 
establishment of new European structures was therefore received as irrational activity. The 
Washington administration did not wish to accept the concept of the common European 
security and defence policy (CESDP), advocating in the early nineteen-nineties the realisation 
of “European identity” (ESDI) within NATO. The CESDP, however, closely tied to NATO, is 
at the same time one of the components of European integration implemented by the EU. It is 
therefore a project the nature and features of which extend beyond the balancing of the 
burdens within the Alliance. 
The differences in the assessment of these two projects sometimes lead to different views 
on the future of the Euro-Atlantic relations. As for Western Europe the alliance with the 
United States today is not a matter of life and death any more, the European politicians are not 
afraid to strongly defend their own point of view, acting in relation to their American allies in 
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the role of equal partners, increasingly aware of their strengths and their objectives. This 
tendency, however, does not present any threat for the Euro-Atlantic bonds. It is only the 
objective reflection of the increasing aspirations of Europe in international politics. Europeans 
need, as Tony Blair argued speaking to Polish politicians in Warsaw – “[Europe] to be a 
major power. Whatever might cause it, today the task of Europe is not only to preserve peace. 
Its main task is to demonstrate its common force.” 
 
2. The Weakness of Europe as a Strength of America: International Security as 
Perceived by Poland and Other CEE Countries 
 
Among the EU countries which are most strongly committed to the process of political 
integration and the balancing of Euro-Atlantic relations connected with the enlargement of the 
Union the conviction exists that Poland, and also to some extent other Central-European 
countries, perceive their securities in the light of the strong relations with the USA. That “pro-
Atlantic orientation” is sometimes used as one of the arguments in favour of creating within 
the EU of a forerunners’ vanguard, consisting of the countries already prepared for closer 
integration. That is supposed to prevent the blocking of the process of further political 
integration of the countries heading towards that end, and thereby toward the new 
arrangement of the Euro-Atlantic relations. This concerns especially the integration in the 
area of the common security and defence policy. 
However, the conviction concerning the inborn pro-American orientation of the CEE 
countries, and above all of Poland, is largely based on certain simplistic preconceptions and is 
not accompanied by any understanding of the reasons for which in the hierarchy of political 
partners of these countries the United States occupy such an important position. It is beyond 
doubt that many Polish politicians contribute powerfully by their statements to the 
reinforcement of the image of Poland as a country for which the relations with the USA are 
more important than the relations with Europe, and the reactions from Washington are the test 
deciding Poland’s position with respect to the initiatives of the Union. 
The strong position of the USA in our region is largely the result of its historical 
experiences and the lack of faith in the support and effectiveness of the policy of Europe. In 
the political consciousness of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, not to mention 
the Baltic states, the USA have not only won the cold war, but their policy after the year of 
1989, rightly or wrongly so, has been perceived as consistent and effective in realising the 
adopted goals. Moreover, and that is extremely important, it has been seen as corresponding 
with the vital interest of this region. Another significant aspect is that the enlargement of 
NATO is being attributed here to the commitment on the part of Washington. 
The belief that co-operation with the United States is easy in comparison to 
collaboration with the EU also stems, to some extent, from the weakness of foreign policies of 
the particular CEE states. They have not yet mastered the capacity to effectively influence the 
policies of the Union and are able to draw benefits from it only to a limited degree. The fact 
that they remain outside the EU is of course an additional barrier in this respect. 
The advantage of the USA over the EU is even more powerfully displayed in the 
sphere of security. Whereas the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the EU does 
not give cause for an major concerns for the CEE countries, the common security and defence 
policy (CESDP) sometimes provokes decisively negative reactions, voicing their opposition 
to the prospect of equipping the EU with military capacity. That opposition is not derived 
from the dislike of the idea as such, but rather from the conviction that this will essentially 
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undermine the American presence in Europe, creating appearances of European force, which 
without NATO will not be capable of acting independently. It is characteristic that such 
concerns result from the geographical-strategic location of these countries, which with the 
exception of the Czech Republic are at the limits of the Euro-Atlantic zone. For them the 
assurance of military security for themselves is still a real problem and forces them to seek 
allies capable to guarantee it. So the choice automatically points at the United States 
disposing of the necessary military potential and which have additionally been able to 
demonstrate their will to defend our region by supporting the admission the Alliance of 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Hence, regardless of the assurances coming from 
the European politicians that the purpose of the CESDP is to reinforce the Euro-Atlantic ties 
and not to undermine the position of the USA in Europe, the respective emerging proposals 
are regarded in the Central European capitals with much reserve and sometimes even with 
suspicion. An example of the latter tendency may be provided by the very positive 
recognition by Poland of the arguments raised by Turkey concerning the issue of the future 
co-operation of the EU with NATO in the framework of the CESDP. 
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II. The European Union and the Countries of Central and Easter Europe: 
Conditions for Better Understanding 
 
1. Acceptance of the CESDP by the Candidate Countries from Central Europe 
 
The enlargement of the EU to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will 
lead to the situation that the creation of the common European foreign and security policy will 
become even more necessary and, at the same time, which is rather paradoxical, it will be 
more difficult to refine that process. The necessity for the enlarged EU to operate jointly in 
the area of foreign policy will result from the fact that the admission of the CEE countries will 
delimit for many years ahead the eastern borders of the Union. This will imply neighbourhood 
with the countries, the policy of which with regards to the EU – in the foreseeable future – 
will not be a policy of integration with the Communities, but a policy of co-operation. The 
same applies to the policy of the EW toward those countries. 
The difficulties in making integration more profound will in turn result from objective 
divergences in the perception of security, in the mode of operation and interpretation of 
events. Membership of the CEE countries will bring about the situation that the EU will 
expand to include a group of countries having common historical experience hitherto absent 
from European politics, related with the several decades of soviet domination over that area. 
Its essence consists of the prevailing, even if gradually declining, sense of military threat, 
concern about their own independence, and also perception of international politics from the 
point of view of national interests. In comparison to EU countries, in the CEE countries the 
culture of co-operation with other countries in the pursuit of common goals is much weaker. 
For the acceptance of the idea of a common European security and defence policy by the 
CEE countries it will be very important whether the EU will realise its existing decisions in 
that sphere, and especially the Operational Goal – the formation of a sixty-thousand men 
strong Rapid Reaction Corps together with all the elements of required support. Because this 
will endorse the European strategy with more credibility. 
There is also no doubt that of major significance for the attitude of these countries toward 
the CESDP is the predictability of the process of enlargement of the Union. The fears still 
existing in those countries that it might be slowed down are one of the causes of the mistrust 
toward the European ideas concerning the sphere of security and defence. Remaining outside 
of the EU is also related with the problem of these countries not participating in all the 
discussions around the CESDP, and also the limited possibilities of influencing the shape and 
the mechanisms of European defence. 
An additional source of many doubts in the CEE countries consists of the deficit of 
knowledge concerning the CESDP, and in connection with that the lack of understanding of 
its nature and purpose. Hence, it would be advisable for the EU to take action in order to 
launch a wide reaching information campaign in the CEE countries to explain the CESDP 
concept. Such a campaign ought to reach above all the political elites and also the opinion 
forming circles in those countries. It would be worthwhile for it to devote much space to the 
explanation of the principles of consultations, which the EU has proposed to the candidate 
countries on this matter. 
Taking into account the fact that over the next few years the intensive discussion on the 
further development of the common security and defence policy will continue among the 
present members of the Union, it is important that the EU should draw into it the current 
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candidates, which should in turn make use of that opportunity. The concepts developed 
together could provide a basis for the further development of the CESDP after the 
enlargement of the EU. Through the participation in the development of the future shape of 
the common defence policy the CEE countries could come to feel co-responsible for its 
implementation. 
Poland and other CEE countries should also make use of the chance to become included 
in the co-operation of the defence industries of the EU countries. This requires a carefully 
thought through strategy of procurement for the armed forces, which must take into account 
the fact that the choice of arms leads to certain consequences of a political nature and is not 
exclusively a matter of the price alone. It would therefore be a mistake to purchase or acquire 
arms only from the United States. 
The predictability of the course of the process of enlargement of the EU would allow to 
prevent the possibility of competition between two processes: the enlargement of the EU and 
of NATO. The lack of prospects for European integration, with the concurrent continued 
expansion of the Alliance, might this cause a complete reversal concerning security issues in 
favour of NATO and the emergence of opposition against the ideas of the Union in that field, 
at least in some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The EU should therefore 
become more aware and bring it also to the attention of others, that its enlargement toward the 
East is related also with security issues. 
It should not be expected, however, that any country of Central and Eastern Europe as a 
member of the EU might assume a position similar to that represented by Denmark, which 
opposes European integration in the area of security and defence. The CEE countries will 
wish to avoid becoming second-class members. Only by being involved in the main current of 
European integration offers them a chance to overcome the differences separating them from 
the present members of the EU. Therefore, these countries can be expected to treat the 
political integration of the EU in the area of security and defence with greater understanding 
than before. 
If within the European Union the view will win the upper hand that some part of its 
members, including the newcomers, should be integrated at a faster pace than the others – 
which might turn out to be indispensable in order to keep up the pace of the political 
integration of Europe – one should do everything possible to prevent such a decision from 
increasing the distance between the policies of the different CEE countries and the rest of the 
EU members. For that would be tantamount to a further reinforcement of the conviction that 
the only available strategic partner for the countries of that region consists of the United 
States.  
 
2. EU Policy Toward the East as an Important Element in the Perception of Trans-
Atlantic Relations by the New Members of the Union 
 
It is also necessary for the EU to understand the specific features of the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, especially their historical experience of their contacts with 
Russia (USSR). That experience need not cause anti-Russian attitudes. The CEE countries, 
when embraced by Euro-Atlantic and European structures, are open to dialogue with 
Moscow, which is exemplified by the improvement in the recent period of the climate of 
Polish-Russian relations. 
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The specific features of the CEE countries indicated in the first part of this paper, as they 
are situated along the future border of the enlarged EU, imply that an extremely important 
role for them will be played by the Eastern policy of the enlarged Union. Already today the 
countries of the “Fifteen” ought to work out scenarios taking into account the emergence of 
the long border in the East with the countries that in the foreseeable future will not join the 
Union. In particular, the future of the Northern Dimension calls for reflection, as its addressee 
is and will probably remain only Russia. The enlarged EU will need to develop the Eastern 
Dimension, which apart from Russia would also embrace Belarus and the Ukraine. 
The lack of clearly defined targets of the Eastern policy of the EU causes the enhanced 
attractiveness of American policy for the CEE countries in that area. Both Poland and the 
Baltic states regard American policy with respect to Russia as more realistic than the vague 
policy of the EU toward Moscow. It is also noticeable how the USA values the significance of 
the Ukraine and the interest, even if marginal, concerning Belarus. 
In spite of the differences between European and American policies concerning Russia, 
the Ukraine and Belarus, visible from the perspective of the CEE countries, these countries 
ought to be committed to the co-ordination of the activities of both parts of the Trans-Atlantic 
community. Although it is difficult to imagine the possibility of identical policies on the part 
of the EU and the USA with respect to the countries of Eastern Europe, it seems realistic to 
expect that the activities of these two actors will mutually complement each other, and that 
they will certainly not be mutually contradictory. 
In the course of the next decade there will be a need for active involvement on the part of 
the new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe in the creation of the Eastern policy of 
the enlarged Union. It would need to consist of the ability to introduce their own concepts to 
the debate within the Union. One of them would consist of the already mentioned Eastern 
Dimension, which would be complementary to the Northern Dimension accepted by the EU, 
which emerged on the initiative of Finland. Our goal ought to consist of demonstrating to the 
EU countries the diversity of the area lying in the immediate neighbourhood of the enlarged 
EU, together with the resulting necessity to conduct a differentiated policy in that area. We 
should counter a policy that frequently seems to be reduced to the “Russia first” concept. 
 
3. The Need for Active Contribution of the New Members to EU Foreign Policy and to 
Providing Europe with a Defence Identity while Maintaining the Trans-Atlantic 
Bonds 
 
If a weakness common to all the CEE countries in their relations with EU were to be 
looked for, it would consist of, despite of some positive changes, the still insufficient ability 
to perceive the European integration as a process of a political nature. This phenomenon 
results not only from the situation of remaining outside of the Communities, and therefore 
insufficient understanding of European politics, but also from the fact of concentrating on 
their own internal problems and striving to meet the criteria for membership of the European 
institutions. It is also beyond any doubt that the feeling of insecurity concerning the future, 
which is to some extent shared by these countries, gives rise to passive attitudes in foreign 
policy, reflected in the reluctance to change the principles, which in the past have guaranteed 
the security and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic zone. In that sense the membership of NATO 
or the EU seems to fully satisfy the political ambitions and, as the experiences of Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary indicate, it might determine the reduced commitment to new 
projects. A factor, which reinforces to some extent that tendency to be passive, or to remain at 
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the margin of the Euro-Atlantic discussions, consists of the objective weakness of the 
institutions of the state, staff deficits, and also reluctance to undertake the extremely difficult 
and costly reform of the armed forces. In other words, the adaptation activities seem to largely 
exhaust the political energy and resources of the CEE countries, preventing them from 
participation in the new EU or NATO initiatives, such as the common defence policy or the 
Defence Capabilities Initiative. 
On the other hand, in spite of the above mentioned weaknesses and limitations, the CEE 
countries are able to become actively involved in the resolution of many international crises, 
confirming thereby that their thinking is not limited only to their own garden. The military 
and police formations from Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Hungary, and in spite of various 
difficulties also from the Czech Republic, take part in the operations of the Alliance in the 
Balkans. What is important, these actions meet with the support of their societies, as their own 
problems do not blind them to the tragedies of others. 
This phenomenon allows to formulate optimistic forecasts for the future, contrary to the 
conviction that Poland and other CEE countries will regard membership of the EU only as a 
means of accelerating their economic growth and that they will oppose the endorsement of its 
own identity to Europe in international politics. Membership of the EU will undoubtedly exert 
an alleviating influence upon the concerns formulated in those countries, especially those 
related with the sense of military threat. Participation in European politics will also probably 
involve a process of political education. The awareness of the enormous mutual dependence 
among the EU countries, their vulnerability to the consequences of crisis situations at the 
peripheries of the continent, will enhance change in the manner of thinking by the CEE 
politicians concerning their own role in Europe and also on the role of Europe in the world. 
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